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I give a brief introduction to many worlds or “no wavefunction collapse” quantum mechanics, suit-
able for non-specialists. I then discuss the origin of probability in such formulations, distinguishing
between objective and subjective notions of probability.
I. DO WAVE FUNCTIONS COLLAPSE?
Quantum mechanics, as conventionally formulated, has two types of time evolution. An isolated system S evolves
according to the Schrodinger equation
|Ψ(t)〉 = exp(−iHt) |Ψ(0)〉 , (1)
where the time evolution operator U(t) = exp(−iHt) is unitary: U†U = 1. However, when a measurement is made the
state undergoes non-unitary von Neumann projection (i.e., collapses) to an eigenstate corresponding to the eigenvalue
observed by the measuring device. Because the two types of time evolution are so radically different, students typically
demand (and indeed are entitled to demand) a rigorous definition of exactly when each of them apply. Unfortunately,
as is widely acknowledged, the conventional interpretation does not supply an entirely satisfactory definition (see,
e.g., Against Measurement by J.S. Bell [1], and the discussion of decoherence below).
Many students over the years (including the author, when he was a student) have wondered whether the mea-
surement process can be described within a larger isolated system S′, containing both the original system S and the
measuring apparatus M , whose dynamics is still unitary. However, measurement collapse and unitary evolution of S′
are incompatible, because the projection operation is not invertible. Collapse is fundamentally irreversible, whereas
unitary evolution of the system and measuring device together is reversible. Nevertheless, as we shall discuss below,
unitary evolution of the larger system S′ is compatible with the appearance of collapse to observers within the system.
To make this discussion more explicit, let S be a single qubit and M a device (e.g., Stern-Gerlach device) which
measures the spin of the qubit along a particular axis. The eigenstates of spin along this axis are denoted |±〉. We
define the operation of M as follows
|+〉 ⊗ |M〉 −→ |+ , M+〉
|−〉 ⊗ |M〉 −→ |− , M−〉 (2)
where M+ denotes a state of the apparatus which has recorded a + outcome, and similarly with M−. We can then
ask what happens to a superposition state |ΨS〉 = c+|+〉 + c−|−〉 which enters the device M . In the conventional
formulation, with measurement collapse, one of the two final states |+ , M+〉 or |− , M−〉 results, with probabilities
|c+|2 and |c−|2 respectively. This probability rule is called the Born rule. In the conventional formulation the notion
of probability enters precisely when one introduces wave function collapse. Without collapse the status of probability
is much more subtle, as we will see.
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FIG. 1: An observer O uses a device M to measure a spin state |±〉. Before the measurement there is a single observer state
|O〉, but afterwards there are two observer states |O±〉.
However, if the combined system S′ = S + M evolves unitarily (in particular, linearly) as in (1), we obtain a
superposition of measurement device states (see figure 1):(
c+|+〉 + c−|−〉
)⊗ |M〉 −→ c+ |+ , M+〉 + c− |− , M−〉 . (3)
At first, this seems counter to actual experience: properly executed measurements produce a single outcome, not
a superposition state. But how do we know for sure? In fact, an observer described by the state M+ might be
unaware of the second branch of the wave function in state M− for dynamical reasons related to a phenomenon called
decoherence [2–5]. First, any object sufficiently complex to be considered either a measuring device or observer (i.e.,
which, in the conventional formulation can be regarded as semi-classical) will have many degrees of freedom. Second,
a measurement can only be said to have occurred if the states M+ and M− differ radically: the outcome of the
measurement must be stored in a redundant and macroscopically accessible way in the device (or, equivalently, in the
local environment). Therefore, the ability of the second branch to affect the first branch is exponentially small: the
overlap of M+ with M− is typically of order exp(−N), where N is a macroscopic number of degrees of freedom, and
the future dynamical evolution of each branch is unlikely to alter this situation. For All Practical Purposes (FAPP,
as J.S. Bell put it), an observer on one branch can ignore the existence of the other: they are said to have decohered.
Each of the two observers will perceive a collapse to have occurred, although the evolution of the overall system S′
has continued to obey the Schrodinger equation.
It is sometimes said that decoherence solves the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. More accurately,
decoherence illuminates the process of measurement. But it does not answer the question of whether or not wave
functions actually collapse – it merely makes it clear that they need not! While decoherence is used in the most
practical settings, such as the analysis of atomic experiments involving entanglement, somehow the analysts often
fail to notice that their calculations work perfectly well in the absence of collapse; the measurement can proceed in
3a perfectly continuous manner, with the different branches rapidly losing contact with each other. The result is the
appearance of a single outcome without invoking collapse.
The idea that wave function collapse is unnecessary, that the whole universe could be thought of as a closed system
obeying the Schrodinger equation and described by a universal wave function, is due to Everett [6, 7]. His conception
is a universal quantum mechanics: one in which observers and measuring devices are treated on the same footing as
all other quantum degrees of freedom – there are no special objects which collapse wave functions. It is sometimes
claimed that the many worlds interpretation is experimentally indistinguishable from the conventional interpretation.
This is true For All Practical Purposes (FAPP [1]), but see Deutsch [8] for an experiment that is sensitive to whether
or not wave functions undergo non-unitary projection. Note also that an implicit assumption of conventional quantum
mechanics is that observers (i.e., objects or measuring procedures that collapse wave functions) cannot themselves
been placed in superposition states. However, rapid progress is being made toward the creation of macroscopic
(Schrondinger’s Cat) superposition states, including, possibly, superpositions of viruses and bugs [9]. If a bug can be
placed in a superposition state, why can’t you?
In fact the foundations of quantum mechanics are not entirely disconnected from practical issues in cosmology. The
cosmic microwave background data favors inflationary cosmology [15], according to which density perturbations in
the early universe originate in the quantum fluctuations of the inflaton field itself. It is very hard to fit this into the
conventional view – what collapses the wavefunction of the inflaton? There are no observers in the early universe – the
very existence and locations of observers (such as humans) are determined by the density perturbations themselves!
Galaxies, stars and planets are found in the overdense regions, but quantum mechanics itself decides which regions
are overdense; there is no classical system outside or observing the universe. It seems much more natural to note
that differential scattering of gravitons due to more or less energy density in a particular region separates the inflaton
wavefunction into decoherent branches. The gravitons decohere the inflaton state vector through interactions. But
this is accomplished through unitary evolution and does not require von Neumann projection or collapse. Other
observers, living on other branches of the wavefunction, see a different CMB pattern on the sky.
II. PROBABILITY AND DETERMINISTIC EVOLUTION
The Schrodinger dynamics governing unitary evolution of the wave function is entirely deterministic. In the absence
of collapse, this is the only kind of time evolution in quantum mechanics. If the initial state of S′ is known at some
initial time t0, it can be predicted with perfect accuracy at any subsequent time t. How, in such a deterministic
system, can the notion of probability arise?
In the conventional interpretation, with only a single realized outcome of an experiment, one simply imposes the Born
probability rule together with measurement collapse: the probability of the plus outcome is |c+|2, or more generally
the likelihood associated with a particular component of the wave function is given by its magnitude squared under
the Hilbert measure. (Philosophically, this imposition of objective randomness is a violent departure from the notion
that all things should have causes; see below.) In the absence of collapse there is no logical point at which we can
introduce a probability rule – it must emerge by itself, and it must explain why an experimenter, who decoheres into
different versions of himself on different branches, does so with probabilities determined by |c±|2. When all outcomes
are realized, what is meant by the probability of a particular one?
The problem is actually worse than this. For decoherence to work in the first place, the overlap or Hilbert space
inner product between two vectors must have a probabilistic interpretation: if the inner product is small (decoherence
has occurred) the two branches are assumed not to influence each other; an observer on one branch may be unaware
of the other. Let us neglect this further, more subtle, complication and simply assume that decoherence and the
measuring apparatus work as desired. Even in this reduced context, there is still a problem, as we now discuss.
4The many worlds interpretation must provide a probability measure over all decoherent outcomes, each of which
is realized, i.e., from the perspective of at least one observer or recording device. The difficulty becomes clear if we
consider N spins: Ψ = ⊗Ni=1 ψi, with each spin prepared in the identical state ψi = c+|+〉i + c−|−〉i. (See figure
2.) Again, all possibilities are realized, including the outcome where, e.g., all spins are measured in the + state:
Ψ ∼ | + + + · · ·+〉. If |c+| is small, then this outcome is very unlikely according to the usual probability rules of
quantum mechanics. However, independent of the value of c+, it comprises one of the 2
N distinct possible outcomes.
Each of these outcomes implies the existence of an observer with distinct memory records.
For N sufficiently large and |c+| 6= |c−|, it can be shown [10] that the vast majority of the 2N realized observers (i.e.,
weighting each distinct observer equally) see an outcome which is highly unlikely according to the usual probability
rules. Note that counting of possible outcomes depends only on combinatorics and is independent of c±. As N →∞,
for all values of c± (excluding exactly zero), almost all of the realized observers find nearly equal number of + and
− spins: there are many more outcomes of the form, e.g., (+ + − + − · · · + − − +) with roughly equal number of
+’s and −’s than with many more of one than the other. This had to be the case, because counting of outcomes is
independent of the values of c±, leading to a symmetry between + and − outcomes in the combinatorics. In contrast,
the Born rule predicts that the relative number of + and − outcomes depends on |c±|2. In the large N limit almost
all (distinct) observers [16] experience outcomes that strongly disfavor the Born probability rule: almost all of the
physicists in the multiverse see experimental violation of the Born rule. Or: almost none of the physicists in the
multiverse see outcomes consistent with the Born rule.
Everett referred to the branches on which results deviate strongly from Born rule predictions (i.e., exhibit highly
improbable results according to the usual probability rule) as maverick branches. By definition, the magnitude of
these components under the Hilbert measure vanishes as N becomes large. But there is no a priori sense in which the
Hilbert measure is privileged in many worlds. Nor is there even a logical place to introduce it – it must emerge in
some way by itself. Everett claimed to derive quantum mechanical probability by taking N to infinity and discarding
all zero norm states in this limit, thereby eliminating all maverick outcomes. Most advocates of many worlds regard
this reasoning as circular and look elsewhere for a justification of the Born rule.
Instead, most attempts to justify the Born rule have relied on subjective probability arguments. (Dynamical
mechanisms for removing maverick branches have also been considered [10, 11].) While objective probabilities can be
defined through frequencies of outcomes of a truly random process, subjective probabilities deal with degrees of belief.
The conventional quantum interpretation, with von Neumann projection, assumes true randomness and objective
probabilities: repeated measurements produce a truly random sequence of outcomes, with frequencies given by the
Born rule. Outcomes are unknowable, even in principle, even with perfect knowledge of the state being measured.
(Einstein objected to the introduction of true randomness, because it implies outcomes without causes.) In the absence
of true randomness, probabilities are subjective and represent degrees of belief [17].
We emphasize again that universal Schrodinger evolution only admits subjective, but not objective, randomness
and probability. Just before the measurement depicted in figure 2, all of the observers are in identical states. Using
the basis |m〉 ≡ |s1, s2, · · · sN 〉, where si are individual spin eigenstates and m runs from 1 to 2N , we can write∑
m
cm |m〉 ⊗ |O〉 = c1 |1〉 ⊗ |O〉 + c2 |2〉 ⊗ |O〉 + c3 |3〉 ⊗ |O〉 + · · ·
−→ c1 |1 , O1〉 + c2 |2 , O2〉 + c3 |3 , O3〉 + · · · =
∑
m
cm |m, Om〉 , (4)
where Om denotes the state describing the observer who recorded outcome m. The first line has been written to
emphasize that in the m basis it appears as if there are 2N identical observers, each of whom is destined to evolve into
a particular one of the Om. Of course, the observer does not know which of the Om they will evolve into, because they
do not (yet) know the spin state |m〉 on their branch. But this is a subjective uncertainty because, indeed, the outcome
is already pre-determined. This perspective may appear more natural if one considers the time reversal of the final
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FIG. 2: An observer measures a state comprised of N spins. Before the measurement there is a single observer state, but
afterwards there are 2N observer states.
state in (4). Each observer Om evolves backward in time to one of the identical O’s. If the ultimate decoherent basis
of the universe were known a priori, the evolution of each branch would appear entirely deterministic [18] [12]. Of
course, this still neglects the question of why my consciousness in particular has been assigned to a specific decoherent
branch of the universal wave function. But this question, which singles out a particular consciousness out of the many
that are presumed to be equally real, is in a sense beyond the many worlds framework.
Subjective probability arguments originate in certain postulates governing the way in which we reason about
probabilities [13]. For example, following Laplace, we might require that two components of the wave function related
by symmetry (i.e., with equal coefficients ci and cj) must have equal probabilities as outcomes. By further analysis, we
might conclude that probability must be proportional to Hilbert space norm squared. Indeed, Gleason’s theorem [14]
suggests that any reasonable calculus of quantum probabilities must result in the familiar Born rule. The reader can
judge for himself whether these arguments are convincing [19]. It is important to emphasize that, even if successful,
such arguments only address whether a particular observer should be surprised to see the Born rule at work on his
branch of the wave function. They do not alter the fact that the many worlds wave function realizes almost exclusively
observers who see gigantic violations of the Born rule (even, gross departures from decoherence). This vast majority
of observers seem unlikely to believe in quantum mechanics as the correct theory of Nature, let alone to conform
to the reasoning described above. The subjective arguments reassure us that we are “unlikely” to be one of these
observers. But are we reassured?
6III. CONCLUSIONS
Decoherence does not resolve the collapse question, contrary to what many physicists think. Rather, it illuminates
the process of measurement and reveals that pure Schrodinger evolution (without collapse) can produce the quantum
phenomena we observe. This of course raises the question: do we need collapse? If the conventional interpretation was
always ill-defined (again, see Bell for an honest appraisal [1]; Everett referred to it as a “philosophical monstrosity”),
why not remove the collapse or von Neumann projection postulates entirely from quantum mechanics?
The origin of probability is the real difficulty within many worlds interpretations. The problem is subtle and
experts are divided as to whether it has been resolved satisfactorily. Because the wave function evolves entirely
deterministically in many worlds, all probabilities are necessarily subjective and the interpretation does not require
true randomness, thereby preserving Einstein’s requirement that outcomes have causes.
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